Source: https://code.google.com/p/google-security-research/issues/detail?id=414&can=1

The following crash was observed in MS Office 2007 running under Windows 2003 x86. Microsoft Office File Validation Add-In is disabled and application verified was enabled for testing and reproduction. This sample did not reproduce in Office 2010 running on Windows 7 x86.

The attached minimized PoC that produces the crash with 2 bit changes from the original file at offsets 0x11E60 and 0x1515F. Standard office document parsers did not reveal any significance about this location.

Attached files:

Fuzzed minimized PoC: 1567070353_min.doc
Fuzzed non-minimized PoC: 1567070353_crash.doc
Original non-fuzzed file: 1567070353_orig.doc

DLL Versions:
mso.dll: 12.0.6721.5000
wwlib.dll: 12.0.6720.5000

Observed Crash:
eax=00000001 ebx=00000004 ecx=0189ff18 edx=00000019 esi=32646a30 edi=0db0eff8
eip=32fbca76 esp=0012bc98 ebp=0012bcb8 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz na po nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00010202

32fbca73 8b7df8          mov     edi,dword ptr [ebp-8]
=> 32fbca76 f6470201        test    byte ptr [edi+2],1         ds:0023:0db0effa=??
32fbca7a 7419            je      mso!Ordinal2690+0x476 (32fbca95)
32fbca7c 833e07          cmp     dword ptr [esi],7
32fbca7f 7414            je      mso!Ordinal2690+0x476 (32fbca95)
32fbca81 8b4508          mov     eax,dword ptr [ebp+8]
32fbca84 6a20            push    20h
32fbca86 ff7010          push    dword ptr [eax+10h]
32fbca89 8d4dfc          lea     ecx,[ebp-4]
32fbca8c 51              push    ecx
32fbca8d ff10            call    dword ptr [eax]
32fbca8f 8127fffffeff    and     dword ptr [edi],0FFFEFFFFh

Stack Trace:
0:000> kb 8
ChildEBP RetAddr  Args to Child
WARNING: Stack unwind information not available. Following frames may be wrong.
0012bcb8 32fbcdc3 0012be28 0d9f4fe8 00000000 mso!Ordinal2690+0x457
0012bccc 32fbce5b 0012be28 0d9f4fe8 0012be28 mso!Ordinal2690+0x7a4
0012bd20 32fbc93e 0012be28 0d9f4fe8 0ddceeb8 mso!Ordinal2690+0x83c
0012bd74 32fbcd73 0012be28 0d9f4fe8 0db2f45a mso!Ordinal2690+0x31f
0012bd94 316dfe8f 0dbe8e38 0012be28 317e9c10 mso!Ordinal2690+0x754
0012bdb0 317e9aa4 0012be08 00000000 00000000 wwlib!wdCommandDispatch+0xcd37
0012bde4 31980e8d 0012be08 000000b4 038b78bc wwlib!wdCommandDispatch+0x11694c
0012c07c 31980b0f 0db2c9c0 00000000 00000001 wwlib!wdCommandDispatch+0x2add35

In this crash the value being dereferenced in edi is free-ed memory:

0:000> !heap -p -a 0xdb0eff8
    address 0db0eff8 found in
    _DPH_HEAP_ROOT @ 1151000
    in free-ed allocation (  DPH_HEAP_BLOCK:         VirtAddr         VirtSize)
                                    d9e5240:          db0e000             2000
    7c83e330 ntdll!RtlFreeHeap+0x0000011a
    0189fe9c vfbasics!AVrfpRtlFreeHeap+0x000000f8
    331039d5 mso!Ordinal1743+0x00002d4d
    329c91d1 mso!MsoFreePv+0x0000003f
    329c913c mso!Ordinal519+0x00000017
    32a54dcc mso!Ordinal320+0x00000021
    32bb6f2e mso!Ordinal379+0x00000eae

There is a 1-bit clear at the location specified by edi shortly after the faulting eip location as well making this an exploitable condition.

Proof of Concept:
https://github.com/offensive-security/exploitdb-bin-sploits/raw/master/bin-sploits/37913.zip